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AGENCY LAW
I. SUPREME COURT REVERSED COURT OF APPEALS AND HELD THAT
FOSTER PARENTS ARE NOT EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES
In Simmons v. Robinson' the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that foster parents are not employees of the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Social Services (DSS). The supreme court's decision reverses
the decision of the South Carolina Court of Appeals,2 which held that
foster parents are employees of DSS and imposed liability on DSS for
the negligence of a foster parent.
DSS placed Arnold Simmons in the home of Ellen D. Anderson, a
foster parent. On July 6, 1985, while on the way to visit Anderson's
relatives, Anderson and Simmons were involved in a car accident in
which Anderson was killed and Simmons was seriously injured. A suit,
which alleged that Anderson's negligence in operating the car caused
the accident, was brought on behalf of Simmons against Anderson's
estate and DSS. DSS denied liability on the ground that its liability
insurance did not cover Anderson because she was not an employee or
agent of DSS.3
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act 4 allows suits against a gov-
ernmental defendant based on causes of action that accrued prior to
July 1, 1986, if the defendant had liability insurance.5 DSS had liabil-
ity insurance for the period when Simmons's cause of action accrued,
but the policy covered only DSS and its employees. The policy pro-
vided coverage for employees operating privately owned vehicles if the
"'operation [was] in the performance of, in connection with, or inci-
dental to their duties.' "'7 The trial judge ruled that Anderson was not
an employee of DSS. The judge did not consider whether Anderson
1. No. 23473 (S.C. filed Sept. 9, 1991).
2. Simmons v. Robinson, 399 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, No. 23473
(S.C. filed Sept. 9, 1991).
3. See id. at 607.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
5. See Simmons, 399 S.E.2d at 607; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-20(c)(i), -180 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990).
6. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d at 607. The trial judge held that in light of the South
Carolina Governmental Vehicle Tort Claims Act, the policy also covered agents of DSS.
Id.
7. Id. (quoting liability insurance policy).
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was an agent. The trial judge further decided that even if Anderson
was an employee, she was not operating the car "'in the performance
of, in connection with-or incidental to her duties'" as a foster parent
when the accident occurred.8 Simmons appealed.
The court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals focused pri-
marily on whether Anderson was an employee of DSS or an indepen-
dent contractor.9 The court stated, "'The decisive test in determining
whether the relation of master and servant [or employer and employee]
exists is whether the purported master [or employer] has the right or
power to direct and control the servant [or employee] in the perform-
ance of [the] work and in the manner in which the work is to be
done.' "10
The court of appeals stated that South Carolina courts should ap-
ply four factors to determine whether the right to control exists. The
factors, which bear on the right of control, are "'(1) direct evidence of
the right to or exercise of control, (2) method of payment, (3) furnish-
ing of equipment, and (4) right to fire.' "1 In determining whether
DSS's right to control foster parents was sufficient to indicate an em-
ployment relationship, the court of appeals examined state regulations
and the DSS policy and procedure manual. The court found that the
regulations authorize DSS to exercise considerable control over foster
parents.12 The DSS policy manual provided further evidence of the
right to control foster parents, including an express reservation by DSS
of the right to supervise foster parents, which the court of appeals
found particularly significant. 13 Based solely on the evidence gleaned
from the DSS regulations and policy manual, the court of appeals de-
cided that foster parents are employees of DSS.24 Because these
sources provided "overwhelming direct evidence of the right of DSS to
control foster parents," 15 the court concluded that an analysis of the
8. Id. (quoting Record at 16).
9. Id. In South Carolina an employer generally is liable for the negligence of an
employee acting within the scope of employment, see Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores,
Inc., 197 S.C. 263, 271, 15 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1941), but not for the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor performing work for the employer, Duane v. Presley Constr. Co., 270
S.C. 682, 683, 244 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1978).
10. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d at 608 (brackets supplied by court) (quoting Felts v. Rich-
land County, 299 S.C. 214, 217, 383 S.E.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 400 S.E.2d 781
(S.C. 1991)).
11. Id. at 609 (quoting Crim v. Decorator's Supply, 291 S.C. 193, 194, 352 S.E.2d
520, 521 (Ct. App. 1987)); accord 1C A- LARsON, TH LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 44.00 (1986).
12. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d at 608-09.
13. Id. at 609.
14. Id. at 609-10.
15. Id. at 609. The trial judge "focuse[d] on the control actually exercised by DSS."
1991]
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other three factors was unnecessary.' 6
The court of appeals decided that because the right to control was
clearly established, separate consideration of each of the remaining fac-
tors was unnecessary.17 "[T]he fundamental test of employment rela-
tion is the right of the employer to control the details of the work, and
. ..all other tests are subordinate and secondary.""' The court of ap-
peals therefore ruled that foster parents are employees of DSS, and
that DSS is liable for the negligence of foster parents. 9
Id. at 610. The court of appeals admitted that only "scant evidence that DSS actually
exercised control over Mrs. Anderson" existed. Id. at 608. The court noted, however, that
"the proper test is whether DSS had the right and authority to control Mrs. Anderson,"
and not whether DSS actually exercised control. Id. at 610 (citing Felts v. Richland
County, 299 S.C. 214, 383 S.E.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 400 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1991)).
16. Id. at 609. The court nevertheless included a brief discussion of the other three
factors. The court concluded that only the fourth factor, the right to fire, was helpful and
its application supported the court's determination. Id.
17. The court of appeals noted that courts in three other states that have considered
the same question reached a contrary result. Id. at 610 n.3 (discussing Kern v. Steele
County, 322 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1982); New Jersey Property-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.
State, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 477 A.2d 826 (App. Div. 1984); Blanca C. v. County of Nassau,
103 A.D,2d 524, 480 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1984), aff'd mem., 65 N.Y.2d 712, 481 N.E.2d 545, 492
N.Y.S.2d 5 (1985)). In Kern the Minnesota Supreme Court applied a five-factor analysis
very similar to the four-factor approach articulated by the Simmons court and deter-
mined that foster parents are not governmental employees. 322 N.W.2d at 189. The Kern
court's analysis reveals the inappropriateness of a mechanical application of every factor
to every setting. As the court of appeals noted in Simmons:
[T]he Court in Kern considered whether foster parents furnish "materials or
tools." We do not think this is a realistic consideration either. The things used
to provide child care are many and varied, everything from bassinets and pab-
ulum plates to bunk beds and book bags. If all these things are to be thought
of as tools, then parents will certainly need enormous toolboxes.
Simmons, 399 S.E.2d at 610 n.3.
18. 1C A. LARSON, supra note 11; accord DeBerry v. Coker Freight Lines, 234 S.C.
304, 307-08, 108 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1959) ("The right or power of control retained by the
person for whom the work is being done is uniformly regarded as the essential criterion
for determining whether the workman is an employee or an independent contractor.").
Often, however, the right to control is not a "demonstrable fact," and analysis of the
other factors is therefore helpful. IC A. LARSON, supra note 11.
19. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d at 609-10. The court of appeals further held that it could
impose liability on DSS even if foster parents were not employees of DSS. First, the
court noted that the DSS liability insurance policy covered agents as well as employees.
The court concluded that the term "agent" encompassed a foster parent's relationship
with DSS. Id. at 612. Second, the court indicated that it could impose liability on DSS
under the concept of nondelegable duties. The court stated, "Some responsibilities are so
important to society that they cannot be transferred." Id. (citing W. KFTN, D. DoBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71 (5th ed. 1984)).
The court determined that the responsibility for children entrusted to DSS by the family
court was such a responsibility. Id.; accord Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273
So. 2d 252, 255-56 (La. 1973).
[Vol. 43
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The supreme court reversed. The supreme court did not view the
DSS regulations as evidence of the right to control. Instead, the court
found that the regulations merely establish procedures that must be
followed in order to be licensed as a foster parent. 0 The court noted
that "'[t]he mere granting of a license or permit to do an act which is
not in itself unlawful or dangerous or a nuisance does not render a
municipality liable for injuries caused by the performance of the
act.' 211 The court stated that before evaluating the right to control,
"the legal relationship between the parties must be determined.122 The
court found that a foster parent is merely a licensee of DSS, not an
employee or independent contractor. The supreme court therefore did
not hold DSS liable for the foster parent's negligence.2
The supreme court's decision is problematic. The court seems to
indicate that a licensee can never be an agent or employee. It seems
clear that circumstances can exist under which a licensee of the State
of South Carolina is also an agent of the state. For example, the state
licenses nurses.2 4 The granting of the license alone would not expose
the state to liability. However, courts in other jurisdictions have held
governmental entities liable for the negligence of licensed nurses that
worked in a government-owned hospital.25 If South Carolina hired a
licensed nurse to work in a state hospital, the courts surely could hold
South Carolina liable for the negligence of that nurse. Similarly, the
state licenses foster parents and hires them to carry out the state's
duty to care for foster children. If a nonlicensed employee or agent
were negligent, the courts would hold the state liable. It is difficult to
understand why the granting of a license shields the state from liability
that courts would impose in the absence of the license.
As a matter of policy, the court of appeals decision in Simmons
may have been too far-reaching because of the enormous liability to
which the state could have been exposed. The court of appeals decision
was, however, well reasoned and consistent with accepted principles of
agency law. By refusing to address the agency question, the supreme
court failed to resolve the true issue in the case.
Thorne B. McCallister
20. Simmons v. Robinson, No. 23473, slip op. at 35 (S.C. filed Sept. 9, 1991).
21. Id. (quoting 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 780 (1950)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36.
24. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 40-33-520 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
25. See Pettis v. State, 336 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that state is liable for
negligence of doctors and nurses in state mental hospital), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 339 So. 2d 855 (La.), modified, 340 So. 2d 1108 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Becker v.
City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 226, 140 N.E.2d 262, 159 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1957) (recognizing
that city can be held liable for the negligence of a nurse in a city hospital).
1991]
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